Would You Like to Enter First with a Low-Quality Good?

Piero Tedeschi; Luca Lambertini

doi:10.1111/j.0307-3378.2007.00262.x

Would You Like to Enter First with a Low-Quality Good?

Piero Tedeschi
, Luca Lambertini

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivista › Articolo › peer review

5 Citazioni (Scopus)

Abstract

Using a two-period duopoly model with vertical differentiation, we show that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where the first entrant supplies a lower quality and gains higher profits than the second entrant. We also prove that this entry sequence is socially efficient.

Lingua originale	Inglese
pagine (da-a)	269-282
Numero di pagine	14
Rivista	Bulletin of Economic Research
Volume	59
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0307-3378.2007.00262.x
Stato di pubblicazione	Pubblicato - 2007

OSS delle Nazioni Unite

Questo processo contribuisce al raggiungimento dei seguenti obiettivi di sviluppo sostenibile

SDG 9 Imprese, innovazione e infrastrutture

Keywords

differentiation
industrial organization
innovation

Accesso al documento

10.1111/j.0307-3378.2007.00262.x

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Link a IRIS PubliCatt

Cita questo

@article{acea77c4d7b1430b9264d8cef3157645,

title = "Would You Like to Enter First with a Low-Quality Good?",

abstract = "Using a two-period duopoly model with vertical differentiation, we show that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where the first entrant supplies a lower quality and gains higher profits than the second entrant. We also prove that this entry sequence is socially efficient.",

keywords = "differentiation, industrial organization, innovation, differentiation, industrial organization, innovation",

author = "Piero Tedeschi and Luca Lambertini",

year = "2007",

doi = "10.1111/j.0307-3378.2007.00262.x",

language = "English",

volume = "59",

pages = "269--282",

journal = "Bulletin of Economic Research",