Would You Like to Enter First with a Low-Quality Good?

Piero Tedeschi, Luca Lambertini

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivistapeer review

5 Citazioni (Scopus)

Abstract

Using a two-period duopoly model with vertical differentiation, we show that there exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium where the first entrant supplies a lower quality and gains higher profits than the second entrant. We also prove that this entry sequence is socially efficient.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)269-282
Numero di pagine14
RivistaBulletin of Economic Research
Volume59
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2007

Keywords

  • differentiation
  • industrial organization
  • innovation

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