Abstract
Are public good games really capturing individuals’ willingness to contribute to real-life public goods? To answer this question, we conducted a
lab-in-the-field experiment with communities who own collective goods. In
our experiment, subjects voluntarily contribute to a common pool, which
can either be subdivided in individual vouchers, as in standard public good
games, or used to acquire collective goods, as it happens for real-life public
goods. We show that participants’ contributions are larger when the voucher
is paid individually, suggesting that individuals’ willingness to contribute to
public goods may be overestimated when based on results from laboratory
experiments.
| Lingua originale | Inglese |
|---|---|
| Numero di pagine | 20 |
| Stato di pubblicazione | Pubblicato - 2018 |
Keywords
- Public goods, lab-in-the-field experiment, cooperation, group behavior, community, indivisibility
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