We don’t know we don’t know: asserting ignorance

Ciro De Florio, Massimiliano Carrara, Daniele Chiffi, Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivistapeer review

3 Citazioni (Scopus)

Abstract

The pragmatic logic of assertions shows a connection between ignorance and (informal) decidability. In it, we can express pragmatic factual ignorance and first-order ignorance as well as some of their variants. We also show how some pragmatic versions of second-order ignorance and of Rumsfeld-ignorance may be formulated. A specific variant of second-order ignorance is particularly relevant. This indicates a strong pragmatic version of ignorance of ignorance, irreducible to any previous form of ignorance, which defines limits to what can justifiably be asserted about higher-order ignorance. Finally, we relate the justified assertion of second-order ignorance (that cannot be known) with scientific assertions.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)N/A-N/A
RivistaSynthese
DOI
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2019

Keywords

  • Logic of Ignorance
  • Pragmatic Logic

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