The paper provides an interpretation of Putnam’s internal realism which is usually interpreted as an anti-realist and anti-metaphysical ontological view. In opposition to this view, the paper argues that internal realism – as Putnam explicitly said – is a «metaphysical substantive theory» of truth. In order to understand this interpretation, the matter ought to be approached starting from Putnam’s theory of meaning. Indeed, Putnam proposes internal realism as a general theory of interaction between speakers and environment – a «theory of the world» – one in which the dichotomy between meaning as use and correspondence is well understood. The paper will firstly introduce Putnam’s theory of meaning as articulated in the Philosophical Papers. Subsequently, it will take into account the epistemological features of a theory of the world as articulated in The Meaning and the Moral Sciences, to finally confirm the metaphysical interpretation of internal realism.
|Titolo tradotto del contributo||[Autom. eng. transl.] Towards a “theory of the world”: meaning and understanding in H. Putnam's internal realism|
|Numero di pagine||17|
|Rivista||RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEOSCOLASTICA|
|Stato di pubblicazione||Pubblicato - 2019|
- Meaning, Understanding, World, Truth, Internal Realism