Unpacking how the biomedical model prioritizes the subpersonal level in mental health inquiry

Biomedical accounts of mental health problems represent the dominant outlook among both academics and practitioners. Yet, there is growing awareness of the theoretical and practical limitations of this approach. In this paper, I first identify three levels of inquiry in mental health, each reflecting a different metatheoretical perspective and generating distinct research questions: the subpersonal, personal, and superpersonal. Next, I illustrate their reciprocal interplay through a contrastive conception of causation whereby causes are defined against the backdrop of the set of assumptions associated with a given level of inquiry. I then argue that the perspective conveyed in the main document used to classify mental health problems – the DSM – is fully biomedical and, as such, tends to prioritize one level of inquiry: the subpersonal. The dominance of the subpersonal level stems from an ideal of science that serves to legitimize mental health disciplines as natural sciences. Yet, this dominance risks obscuring or underrating major personal and superpersonal factors that may have a bearing upon mental health problems. In conclusion, I contend that redistributing the focus of inquiry to include greater scrutiny of the personal and superpersonal domains would increase the scope – and effectiveness – of scientific accounts of mental health issues.