The Value of Voting Rights in Italian Cooperative Banks: A Quasi-Natural Experiment

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivista

Abstract

It is widely believed in the corporate governance literature that deviating from the `one share-one vote' principle leads to corporate inefficiencies. We analyze the market reaction to a change from the `one head-one vote' to the `one share-one vote' mechanism by means of a quasi-natural experiment: an Italian reform forcing a subset of cooperative banks to transform into joint-stock companies. We estimate the market valuation of the effects of the governance change around the event date being equal to a cumulative average return of about 14% using an event study methodology, and of about 13% using bayesian techniques.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)861-882
Numero di pagine22
RivistaManagerial Finance
Volume46
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2020

Keywords

  • Bank Regulation
  • Corporate Governance
  • Corporate Voting
  • Voting Premium

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