The Thin Red Line, Molinism, and the Flow of Time

In addressing the problem of the (in)compatibility of divine foreknowledge\r\nand human freedom, philosophers of religion encounter problems\r\nregarding the metaphysics and structure of time. Some models\r\nof temporal logic developed for completely independent reasons have\r\nproved especially appropriate for representing the temporal structure\r\nof the world as Molinism conceives it. In particular, some models of the\r\nThin Red Line (TRL) seem to imply that conditionals of freedom are\r\ntrue or false, as Molinists maintain. Noting the resemblance between\r\nMolinism and TRL models, Restall (2011) has advanced some criticisms\r\nof Molinism that have also been leveled against TRL models. In\r\nparticular, Restall believes that the implication p --> HFp is not true\r\nin TRL models. Because Molinists must also accept that this implication\r\nis not true, this is a problem for them. We will show that Restall’s\r\ncriticism is wide of the mark. Firstly, it will be demonstrated that in\r\nmany open future models (not just TRL) the implication p --> HFp is\r\ninvalid. Secondly, while it is possible to account for this implication,\r\nsome modifications are required in respect of the branching time semantics.\r\nIn proposing one such modification, we show that this new semantics can be adopted by advocates of the TRL and, as a consequence,\r\nby Molinists as well. We conclude that the principle stated\r\nby Restall is either a problem for many open future models (not just\r\nfor Molinists) or can be accounted for by these models and so is not a\r\nproblem for Molinists either.