The Social Value of Public Information with Costly Information Acquisition

Luca Vittorio Angelo Colombo; Gianluca Femminis

The Social Value of Public Information with Costly Information Acquisition

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivista › Articolo › peer review

Abstract

In a beauty contest framework, public authorities decide the accuracy of public information evaluating how it affects individual actions and private information acquisition. More precise public information increases welfare whenever its marginal cost does not exceed that of private information.

Lingua originale	Inglese
pagine (da-a)	196-199
Numero di pagine	4
Rivista	Economics Letters
Stato di pubblicazione	Pubblicato - 2008

Keywords

Coordination
Private information
Public information
Welfare

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title = "The Social Value of Public Information with Costly Information Acquisition",

abstract = "In a beauty contest framework, public authorities decide the accuracy of public information evaluating how it affects individual actions and private information acquisition. More precise public information increases welfare whenever its marginal cost does not exceed that of private information.",

keywords = "Coordination, Private information, Public information, Welfare, Coordination, Private information, Public information, Welfare",

author = "Colombo, \{Luca Vittorio Angelo\} and Gianluca Femminis",

year = "2008",

language = "English",

pages = "196--199",

journal = "Economics Letters",

issn = "0165-1765",

publisher = "Elsevier B.V.",

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TY - JOUR

T1 - The Social Value of Public Information with Costly Information Acquisition

AU - Colombo, Luca Vittorio Angelo

AU - Femminis, Gianluca

PY - 2008

Y1 - 2008

N2 - In a beauty contest framework, public authorities decide the accuracy of public information evaluating how it affects individual actions and private information acquisition. More precise public information increases welfare whenever its marginal cost does not exceed that of private information.

AB - In a beauty contest framework, public authorities decide the accuracy of public information evaluating how it affects individual actions and private information acquisition. More precise public information increases welfare whenever its marginal cost does not exceed that of private information.

KW - Coordination

KW - Private information

KW - Public information

KW - Welfare

KW - Coordination

KW - Private information

KW - Public information

KW - Welfare

UR - http://hdl.handle.net/10807/25669

M3 - Article

SN - 0165-1765

SP - 196

EP - 199

JO - Economics Letters

JF - Economics Letters

ER -

The Social Value of Public Information with Costly Information Acquisition

Abstract

Keywords

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