The Shapley value analyzed under the Felsenthal and Machover bargaining model

Giulia Bernardi*, Josep Freixas

*Autore corrispondente per questo lavoro

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivista

3 Citazioni (Scopus)


In 1996, Felsenthal and Machover proposed a bargaining procedure for a valuable payoff in cooperative and simple games. They proved that the value underlying their bargaining scheme was the Shapley value by showing that it verifies the axioms that Shapley proposed for characterizing his value. They remarked that a direct proof of the result involves rather formidable combinatorial difficulties, but that it has some independent interest. In this paper, we prove such a combinatorial result and obtain a formula for the Shapley value that has a great potential to be extended to more general classes of games.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)557-565
Numero di pagine9
RivistaPublic Choice
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2018
Pubblicato esternamente


  • Bargaining procedures
  • Cooperative games
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Roll-calls
  • Shapley value
  • Simple games
  • Sociology and Political Science


Entra nei temi di ricerca di 'The Shapley value analyzed under the Felsenthal and Machover bargaining model'. Insieme formano una fingerprint unica.

Cita questo