The role of corporate political strategies in M&As

Ettore Croci, Jung Chul Park

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivista

9 Citazioni (Scopus)

Abstract

In line with the view that politics can complicate M&A deals, we find that firms contributing to political action committees or involved in lobbying are less likely to be acquired and their takeover process is lengthier. As we empirically show, this can be explained by the fact that politicians have motives to interfere with the takeover process due to career concerns, in terms of getting re-elected and raising funds for future campaigns. We also document that politically connected target firms command higher takeover premiums from bidders lacking political expertise, consistent with the notion that the market regards target firms' connections, not easily replicable by bidders, as means to enhance growth opportunities of the merged firm.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)260-287
Numero di pagine28
RivistaJournal of Corporate Finance
Volume43
DOI
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2017

Keywords

  • Acquisition probability
  • Business and International Management
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance
  • Lobbying activity
  • Merger and acquisition
  • PAC contribution
  • Strategy and Management1409 Tourism, Leisure and Hospitality Management
  • Takeover premium
  • Time to completion

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