The Retro-Closure Principle and Omniscience

Todd and Rabern (2021) have argued that if we assume that future\r\ncontingents are untrue and if we accept the Retro-closure principle, then the existence of a temporal omniscient entity becomes\r\nmetaphysically impossible. Since the truth of a metaphysical and\r\ntheological theory should not be dependent on questions of temporal\r\nsemantics, Todd and Rabern conclude that, if one wishes to maintain\r\nthat future contingents are untrue, one must abandon the Retro-closure\r\nprinciple. The aim of this paper is to propose a temporal semantics system\r\nin which future contingents are untrue, the Retro-closure principle is\r\nvalid, and the possibility of the existence of an omniscient and temporal\r\nbeing is guaranteed.