The epistemic status of introspection remains a controversial topic. due to its subjective char- acter, introspection is not an easy fit with natural sciences or a physicalistic picture of the mind. In literature, introspection is conceived as dealing only with macro-cognition and not with micro-cognition, the supposed object of study of scientific psychology. This essay dis- cusses the epistemic status of introspection in light of its relationship with folk psychology and spells it out through an analysis of the positions of Wilkes, Alston, Schwitzgebel, and Churchland. Specifically, the essay makes a distinction between folk and scientific psychol- ogy and addresses the issue of the incorrigibility/infallibility of introspective judgments. The essay endorses a view according to which introspection should be conceived as a cognitive process the contents of which are provided by folk knowledge. It shows how this view can be appreciated as scientific, provided that a physicalistic image of the mind is rejected.
|Numero di pagine||20|
|Rivista||RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEOSCOLASTICA|
|Stato di pubblicazione||Pubblicato - 2021|
- Folk Psychology
- Human Sciences
- Natural Sciences
- Scientific Psychology