TY - JOUR
T1 - The Political Economy of Technocratic Governments
AU - Merzoni, Guido Stefano
AU - Trombetta, Federico
PY - 2024
Y1 - 2024
N2 - This paper proposes a game theoretical model of technocratic government, i.e. cases where a non political technocrat is put in charge by political parties. We find conditions for the existence of a technocratic government equilibrium, where parties agree to delegate the agenda setting power to technocrats, committed to maximize social welfare. Such an equilibrium exists only if technocrats are more competent than ordinary politicians. Furthermore, we show that unstable parliaments increase the range of parameters where a technocratic government equilibrium exists. Polarization can also increase the likelihood of a technocratic government.
AB - This paper proposes a game theoretical model of technocratic government, i.e. cases where a non political technocrat is put in charge by political parties. We find conditions for the existence of a technocratic government equilibrium, where parties agree to delegate the agenda setting power to technocrats, committed to maximize social welfare. Such an equilibrium exists only if technocrats are more competent than ordinary politicians. Furthermore, we show that unstable parliaments increase the range of parameters where a technocratic government equilibrium exists. Polarization can also increase the likelihood of a technocratic government.
KW - Technocratic governments
KW - Technocratic governments
UR - http://hdl.handle.net/10807/298097
U2 - 10.1007/s00355-024-01551-0
DO - 10.1007/s00355-024-01551-0
M3 - Article
SN - 0176-1714
SP - N/A-N/A
JO - Social Choice and Welfare
JF - Social Choice and Welfare
ER -