COVID-19 heavily impacted Europe, both in human and material terms. The pandemic also highlighted the problems that the Union faces in defining a shared course of action, even when dealing with issues of shared scope and interest. In this perspective, the adoption of a massive package of financial measures ("Next Generation EU") is, in itself, a positive result. However, the pivotal role that the response to the COVID-19 challenge poses to the current European Commission risks overshadowing other priorities, which the Commission had also set itself, including a redefinition in a more "geopolitical" sense of the international role of the Union. The risk, in particular, is that the earmarking for other purposes of the resources long foreseen for the financing of "Europe of Defence" will end up depriving the Union of the instruments necessary for a more active and effective external action. All this while the pressure on national resources seems destined to push down Defence spending also in the Member States. The fact that -- despite the competition from other programs -- a certain amount of resources has been allocated to the financing of the EDF and other initiatives in the field of Defence is a positive sign and could be an incentive for collaboration among the Member States. The main problem remains the ability to aggregate an adequate consensus and sufficient political convergence around this project, also taking into account the difficulties that NATO is experiencing and how the #NATO2030 initiative, launched in June 2020 by Secretary General Stoltenberg, will develop.
|Titolo della pubblicazione ospite||Osservatorio Strategico [CeMiSS] - 2020/03|
|Numero di pagine||6|
|Stato di pubblicazione||Pubblicato - 2020|
- Industria europea della difesa
- Politica europea di sicurezza e difesa