The erosion of personal norms and cognitive dissonance

Fabrizio Panebianco, Vicente Calabuig, Gonzalo Olcina

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivista

Abstract

In this article, we study how personal norms and behaviour interact and evolve when agents try to reduce cognitive dissonance, and how this dynamic relates to Nash equilibrium. We find that in long run, agents play, and norms prescribe, Nash equilibrium in material payoffs (in the absence of norms). Our model captures two main facts: (i) norms erode along the play of the game; (ii) the erosion of norms depends on the set of possible economic choices, so that the policy maker can potentially influence them.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)1265-1268
Numero di pagine4
RivistaApplied Economics Letters
Volume23
DOI
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2016

Keywords

  • Cognitive dissonance
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Nash equilibrium
  • dominant strategies
  • norm dynamics

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