The Administrative Board of Review of the European Central Bank. A critical analysis

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivistapeer review

Abstract

The Administrative Board of Review provides the addressees of the European Central Bank supervisory decisions with effective protection of their rights within the Banking Union framework. Indeed, appealing to the Board is convenient compared to appealing to the Court of Justice of the European Union. However, the opinions of the Administrative Board of Review typically influence future judgments by the Court of Justice of the European Union, which is unlikely to diverge from what was decided at the administrative level. Therefore, instead of serving as a further instrument of protection, the Administrative Board of Review either shifts protection from the jurisdictional to the administrative level, if an individual decides to appeal to the Board; or it risks remaining a dead letter, if an individual prefers to appeal directly to the Court. Currently, the decision to appeal to the Administrative Board or directly to the Court of Justice depends on the authoritativeness and substantial independence of the members of the Administrative Board of Review. A further way to improve addressees’ protection would be to publicize the opinions of the Administrative Board of Review, which could also increase the accountability of the Board without entailing high costs.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)519-538
Numero di pagine20
RivistaORIZZONTI DEL DIRITTO COMMERCIALE
Volume2020
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2020

Keywords

  • Bankin Union – Single Supervisory Mechanism – Administrative Board of Review

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