In the first part of 2020, the US action in the Middle East and the Gulf seemed marked by new activism, whose most significant results were the mutual recognition agreements signed between mid-August and mid-September by Israel, United Arab Emirates and Bahrain (the so-called "Abraham accords"). The comments on the accords and the possibility that they would result in more regional stability have been different, of different tenor and in several cases negative, both for their clear anti-Iranian connotation and for their placing the Israeli-Palestinian question on the margins of the scene. At the moment, the new Middle Eastern policy of the United States presents several weaknesses, such as the resistance it meets, which is not limited to the Palestinian front alone. Moreover, it is a question of understanding how much breath this policy will have if the vote on November 3 leads to a change in the White House; this also because Joe Biden would be committed -- in case of victory -- to relaunch the dialogue with Tehran on the delicate issue of nuclear power. The signatories of the Abraham accords expressed their confidence in their holding. Despite this, it is still probable that a Biden administration will give the agreements a different turn than the original one. In any case, this could make the Trump administration's initiatives the precondition both for a credible de-escalation in the Middle East and the Gulf and for a revival of the role of the United States in the region.
|Titolo della pubblicazione ospite||Osservatorio Strategico [CeMiSS] - 2020/04|
|Numero di pagine||5|
|Stato di pubblicazione||Pubblicato - 2021|
- Accordi di Abramo