Termination Clauses in Partnerships

Stefano Comino, Piero Tedeschi, Antonio Nicolò

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivista

7 Citazioni (Scopus)


We show that when designing a partnership agreement partner firms may prefer not to specify how to allocate the commonly owned assets should there be an early termination of the contract. By not including such a clause, firms induce litigation before a Court with positive probability. Firms create this ex-post inefficiency in order to increase the levels of non-contractible investments, i.e.increase the ex-ante efficiency. The absence of an asset allocation clause works as a "discipline device" that mitigates the hold-up problem within the partnership. In our set-up, no other contract but that without an asset allocation clause can credibly create an ex-post inefficiency.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)718-732
Numero di pagine15
RivistaEuropean Economic Review
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2010


  • Contract
  • Hold-up
  • Joint venture


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