Strategic delegation under cost asymmetry revised

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivista

3 Citazioni (Scopus)

Abstract

We revisit the Cournot duopoly game with strategic delegation and asymmetric costs of Delbono, Lambertini, and Marattin (2016). In particular, the authors claim that a Prisoner Dilemma always arises. However, we show that, by setting properly the admissible parameter set, if the firms are sufficiently different, the efficient firm is better off when both firms delegate production. Therefore, in contrast with the traditional view, we claim that a Prisoner Dilemma is not an inevitable outcome in a strategic delegation game.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)527-529
Numero di pagine3
RivistaOperations Research Letters
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2019

Keywords

  • strategic delegation

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