Schelling’s Meontology and the Concept of Possibility in Kierkegaard

In Kierkegaard’s teatment of the concept of reality, possibility, freedom (fhe not-necessioty of the history) Both in the “Concept of Anxiety and in “Philosophical Fragments” is possible to make out Schelling’s meontology, that is the philosophical discourse concerning the negation of the actual being of something, but not its possibility. The article makes first a survey of the latest philosophy of Schellingt’s so-called “positive-philosophy” and explains its methodological meaning for the development of philosophy of Mythology and philosophy of Revelation. It s shows how Kierkegaard’s thought could have been attracted by Schelling’s “Spätphilosophy” and its way of treating the concepts of possibility and reality in opposition to Hegel’s “negatìve philosophy”, but in the end it shows why Kierkegaard could not accept even Schelling’s speculation.