Abstract
The Italian legislation on corporate liability is reminiscent of the prisoner's dilemma. The two major players, i.e. the State and the private enterprise, are willing to cooperate in order to fulfill their own purposes. Yet, in the absence of a credible agreement, they go separate ways. This paper analyzes the principles of corporate liability through the agency relationship, the information economy and the theory of incentives, and it puts forward some fundamental corrections to the current legislation. The aim is to optimize the public-private partnership in corporate crime risk management so as to achieve a more effective prevention of economic crimes and minimize the costs incurred into by private organizations. Hence, the legislator is called upon to design a "credible" regulation that can actually build a positive relationship between the parties in order to align their goals and to foster the acceptance of certain core principles that can ensure a sharing of relevant information in the future.
Titolo tradotto del contributo | [Autom. eng. transl.] LIABILITY FROM CRIMES OF THE ENTITIES AND "AGENCY PROBLEMS". THE LIMITS OF D.LGS. 231 OF 2001 AND THE REFORM PERSPECTIVES |
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Lingua originale | Italian |
pagine (da-a) | 945-987 |
Numero di pagine | 43 |
Rivista | RIVISTA ITALIANA DI DIRITTO E PROCEDURA PENALE |
Stato di pubblicazione | Pubblicato - 2017 |
Keywords
- Leigslative Decree 231/01
- Responsabilità degli enti
- corporate liability
- d.lgs. 231/01
- incentivi
- theory of incentives