Abstract
The Italian legislation on corporate liability is reminiscent of the prisoner’s dilemma.\r\nThe two major players, i.e. the State and the private enterprise, are willing\r\nto cooperate in order to fulfill their own purposes. Yet, in the absence of a credible\r\nagreement, they go separate ways. This paper analyzes the principles of corporate\r\nliability through the agency relationship, the information economy and the theory\r\nof incentives, and it puts forward some fundamental corrections to the current\r\nlegislation. The aim is to optimize the public-private partnership in corporate crime\r\nrisk management so as to achieve a more effective prevention of economic crimes\r\nand minimize the costs incurred into by private organizations. Hence, the legislator\r\nis called upon to design a “credible” regulation that can actually build a positive\r\nrelationship between the parties in order to align their goals and to foster the\r\nacceptance of certain core principles that can ensure a sharing of relevant information\r\nin the future.
Titolo tradotto del contributo | Criminal liability of entities and agency problems. The limits of Legislative Decree no. 231 of 2001 and the prospects for reform |
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Lingua originale | Italian |
pagine (da-a) | 945-987 |
Numero di pagine | 43 |
Rivista | RIVISTA ITALIANA DI DIRITTO E PROCEDURA PENALE |
Numero di pubblicazione | 3 |
Stato di pubblicazione | Pubblicato - 2017 |
Keywords
- Responsabilità degli enti
- agency relationship
- corporate liability
- criminalità d'impresa
- incentivi
- relazione d'agenzia
- risk management
- theory of incentives