Abstract
We investigate the empirical determinants of social pacts over the 1970-2004 period. We adopt a political economy approach, showing that governments are more likely to sign a pact when the cost of a conflict with trade unions is relatively larger. Such a cost depends on macroeconomic variables and on measures of social conflict and union strength. These findings are remarkably stable across sub-periods, in apparent contrast with previous contributions that emphasised differences between first- and second-generation pacts. Our interpretation is that pacts were different across periods because the policy issues changed, but the incentives to seek union consensus did not. © 2013 Association for Comparative Economic Studies.
Lingua originale | English |
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pagine (da-a) | 358-374 |
Numero di pagine | 17 |
Rivista | Journal of Comparative Economics |
Volume | 42 |
DOI | |
Stato di pubblicazione | Pubblicato - 2014 |
Keywords
- Economics and Econometrics
- Institutions
- Macroeconomic outcomes
- Social pacts