Reinterpreting social pacts: Theory and evidence

Emilio Colombo, Patrizio Tirelli, Jelle Visser

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivistapeer review

5 Citazioni (Scopus)

Abstract

We investigate the empirical determinants of social pacts over the 1970-2004 period. We adopt a political economy approach, showing that governments are more likely to sign a pact when the cost of a conflict with trade unions is relatively larger. Such a cost depends on macroeconomic variables and on measures of social conflict and union strength. These findings are remarkably stable across sub-periods, in apparent contrast with previous contributions that emphasised differences between first- and second-generation pacts. Our interpretation is that pacts were different across periods because the policy issues changed, but the incentives to seek union consensus did not. © 2013 Association for Comparative Economic Studies.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)358-374
Numero di pagine17
RivistaJournal of Comparative Economics
Volume42
DOI
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2014

Keywords

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Institutions
  • Macroeconomic outcomes
  • Social pacts

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