Redistribution and Tax Evasion: an Asymmetric Information Approach

Silvia Platoni, Francesco Timpano

Risultato della ricerca: Working paper


The article studies the optimal redistribution system, achieved by direct taxation, indirect taxation and public provision of the pseudo-necessary good, when individuals, who differ in productivity, can take hidden actions (tax evasion by moral hazard) and have hidden information (tax evasion by adverse selection). It proves that any Government willing to effectively reallocate resources among individuals has to undertake measures against tax evasion, i.e. to establish tax evasion fines.
Lingua originaleEnglish
Numero di pagine35
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2013


  • Asymmetric Information
  • Redistribution
  • Tax Evasion


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