Abstract
Hitherto metaphysics has usually relied upon the same concept of reality that prevails within common sense and natural science, i.e. being a possible object of sensible experience: but according to the rules of logic such a concept is incompatible with the assertion and even the assumption of a supersensible reality. However, we have no reason to consent to it because it derives from an undue absolutization of the pragmatic criterion according to which my actual body is given a pre-eminence over my dreamed or imagined bodies and my real world is given a pre-eminence over all those Leibnizian possible worlds that some analytical philosophers rightly consider to be as real as our real world. In fact, a correct ontology must admit the ultimate identity of possibility and reality; as for the existence of God, it is to be proved a priori, on the model of St. Anselm’s argument, not a posteriori.
| Titolo tradotto del contributo | [Autom. eng. transl.] Reality, existence, possible worlds |
|---|---|
| Lingua originale | Italian |
| pagine (da-a) | 259-266 |
| Numero di pagine | 8 |
| Rivista | Acta Philosophica |
| Volume | XXXIII |
| Numero di pubblicazione | 2 |
| DOI | |
| Stato di pubblicazione | Pubblicato - 2024 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Filosofia
Keywords
- A Priori Proof of the Existence of God
- Fictitious Entities
- Metaphysics
- Possible Worlds
- Transcendence