Realismo scientifico senza scientismo: la proposta di Hilary Putnam

The reflection of Hilary Putnam over the scientific realism endured frequent\r\ndistortions inside the contemporary epistemologic debate. Just recently, in fact, in\r\nPhilosophy in an Age of Science (2012), Putnam himself wanted to explicitly denounce\r\nthe undeserved identification of his originary scientific realism with the scientism, as well\r\nas the illegitimacy of the resulting criticism of incoherence considering the new appreciation\r\nof metaphysics of the Nineties. On the other hand, in Mathematics, matter andmethod (1975), Putnam has already led a fierce criticism against the logical empiricist\r\nscientism and its deceptive and non realistic concept of science. The paper intents to\r\npresent this criticism starting with the analysis of some essays from the first volume of\r\nthe Philosophical Papers, in order to bring to the “backlight” surface the actual nature of\r\nhis scientific realism. The scientific realism will, first of all, show itself like the attitude of\r\nthe phylosopher, or rather of the scientist, in front of the scientific activity: differently\r\nfrom the non-realistic “deductivism” which prior imposes its own methodological rules\r\nas an essential warrancy of truth, the scientific realism refuses such “feticism” of the\r\nmethod, sure that the scientific activity works by itself in the sphere of truth, as in inside\r\nthe space defined by the relationship between a subject and something else. Such polarity\r\nwill be verified through Putnam’s criticism against the geo-chronometric conventionalism\r\nof Adolf Grünbaum (An Examination of Grünbaum’s Philosophy of Geometry,\r\n1963), in terms of “existential relevance” of scientific theories, even when recognising\r\nconventional elements in the definition with reference to physical quantities.