Quality of After-Sales Services in a Competitive Insurance Sector†

Piero Tedeschi, Alessandro Fedele

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivista

Abstract

[Ita:]This paper tackles the issue of unverifiable quality of after-sales insurance services, such as a prompt reimbursement of damages. A dynamic model is introduced in order to allow reputation to emerge as a means of disciplining insurance firms to deliver high quality. The equilibrium of a repeated Bertrand game among the insurers is analysed and conditions are derived under which more concentration in the insurance industry can lead to greater equilibrium consumer welfare.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)65-88
Numero di pagine24
RivistaTHE GENEVA RISK AND INSURANCE REVIEW
Volume40
DOI
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2014

Keywords

  • Bertrand competition
  • after-sales services
  • insurance sector
  • reputation
  • unverifiable quality

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