Prisoner dilemma in a vertical duopoly with managerial delegation

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivista


We consider managerial delegation with two firms producing goods of different qualities. We show that both firms choose to delegate in equilibrium, but a prisoner dilemma is not inevitable in the case of Cournot competition. Indeed, when the quality asymmetry is sufficiently large, the profits of the high-quality firm are greater than in the case of no delegation.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)1476-1481
Numero di pagine6
RivistaManagerial and Decision Economics
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2022


  • managerial delegation


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