Abstract
The Slippery Slope Framework of tax compliance postulates that citizens’ compliance
depends on the power of the authorities to enforce compliance and/or trust in the authorities
and voluntary cooperation. While trust is widely recognized as a strong determinant
of cooperation, empirical evidence is less clear on power: severe fines may lead towards
compliance or even have the opposite effect. We propose a thorough investigation of the
nature of power (coercive versus legitimate) within the theoretical framework of tax compliance
to shed light on the ambiguous results and to clarify the complex relation between
power and trust. We use structural equation modeling to test the assumptions of the Slippery
Slope Framework by taking into account coercive power and legitimate power on a
sample of N = 389 self-employed Italian taxpayers and entrepreneurs. We found evidence
that trust is positively related to voluntary tax compliance. Trust was found to be negatively
related to coercive power and positively related to legitimate power. Both coercive
power and legitimate power were correlated with enforced compliance. However, the
effect of enforced compliance leads to increased evasion. The results evidence the multifaceted
nature of power and trust and their relation with tax compliance, and the importance
of power and trust in political regulatory strategies.
Lingua originale | English |
---|---|
pagine (da-a) | 36-45 |
Numero di pagine | 10 |
Rivista | Journal of Economic Psychology |
Volume | 34 |
DOI | |
Stato di pubblicazione | Pubblicato - 2013 |
Keywords
- Slippery Slope Framework
- tax compliance