Abstract
This paper studies how political fragmentation affects government stability. Using a regression-discontinuity design, we show that each additional party with representation in\r\nthe local parliament increases the probability that the incumbent government is unseated by 5 percentage points. The entry of an additional party affects stability by increasing both\r\nthe probability of a single-party majority and the instability of governments when such a majority is not feasible. We interpret our results in light of a bargaining model of coalition\r\nformation featuring government instability.
Lingua originale | Inglese |
---|---|
pagine (da-a) | 23-50 |
Numero di pagine | 28 |
Rivista | American Economic Journal: Applied Economics |
Volume | 14 |
Numero di pubblicazione | 2 |
DOI | |
Stato di pubblicazione | Pubblicato - 2022 |
All Science Journal Classification (ASJC) codes
- Economia, Econometria e Finanza Generali
Keywords
- Bargaining
- Fragmentation
- Government Stability
- No-confidence votes