Political exchange and the allocation of surplus: a model of two-party competition

Michele Grillo; Michele Polo

Political exchange and the allocation of surplus: a model of two-party competition

Michele Grillo
, Michele Polo

Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in libro › Capitolo

Abstract

The contribution elaborates a theoretical model of two-party competition. The main result concerns condition under which competition leads in equlibrium to divergence of the party's electoral programs.

Lingua originale	Inglese
Titolo della pubblicazione ospite	Preferences and Democracy
Editor	ALBERT BRETON, GIANLUIGI GALEOTTI, PIERRE SALMON, RONALD WINTROBE
Pagine	215-244
Numero di pagine	30
Stato di pubblicazione	Pubblicato - 1993

Keywords

Political competition
Political exchange

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title = "Political exchange and the allocation of surplus: a model of two-party competition",

abstract = "The contribution elaborates a theoretical model of two-party competition. The main result concerns condition under which competition leads in equlibrium to divergence of the party's electoral programs.",

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author = "Michele Grillo and Michele Polo",

year = "1993",

language = "English",

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AU - Polo, Michele

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KW - Political competition

KW - Political exchange

UR - http://hdl.handle.net/10807/26238

M3 - Chapter

SN - 0-7923-9321-X

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EP - 244

BT - Preferences and Democracy

A2 - BRETON, ALBERT

A2 - GALEOTTI, GIANLUIGI

A2 - SALMON, PIERRE

A2 - WINTROBE, RONALD

ER -

Political exchange and the allocation of surplus: a model of two-party competition

Abstract

Keywords

Altri file e collegamenti

Fingerprint

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