TY - JOUR
T1 - Performance, investment, and financing patterns of family firms after going public
AU - Croci, Ettore
AU - Rigamonti, Silvia
AU - Signori, Andrea
PY - 2022
Y1 - 2022
N2 - Research Question/Issue: This study investigates the performance, investment, and
financing patterns of family firms after they go public.
Research Findings/Insights: Despite the common claim that most initial public offerings
(IPOs) are motivated by growth considerations, we find that the operating performance
of family firms declines after going public relative to non-family issuers and
comparable private firms. This effect is long-lasting and not due to earnings management
before the IPO. We also document that family firms do not differ from other
firms in terms of investment activities, but they experience a smaller decrease in
leverage.
Theoretical/Academic Implications: The contributions of this study are threefold.
First, it delves into the incentives of controlling families when facing the IPO decision.
Second, while financial investors' ability to effectively time IPO decisions has
been previously documented, this study shows that families, despite peculiar incentives,
take their firms public before a performance decline. Third, it examines the
behavior of family firms concerning the usage of IPO proceeds.
Practitioner/Policy Implications: Families accept diluting their stake in an IPO
when they know that firm performance is about to deteriorate. This increases the
relative attractiveness of the non-pecuniary benefits of control, most of which
remain with the family, over financial wealth, whose future value is expected
to decrease.
AB - Research Question/Issue: This study investigates the performance, investment, and
financing patterns of family firms after they go public.
Research Findings/Insights: Despite the common claim that most initial public offerings
(IPOs) are motivated by growth considerations, we find that the operating performance
of family firms declines after going public relative to non-family issuers and
comparable private firms. This effect is long-lasting and not due to earnings management
before the IPO. We also document that family firms do not differ from other
firms in terms of investment activities, but they experience a smaller decrease in
leverage.
Theoretical/Academic Implications: The contributions of this study are threefold.
First, it delves into the incentives of controlling families when facing the IPO decision.
Second, while financial investors' ability to effectively time IPO decisions has
been previously documented, this study shows that families, despite peculiar incentives,
take their firms public before a performance decline. Third, it examines the
behavior of family firms concerning the usage of IPO proceeds.
Practitioner/Policy Implications: Families accept diluting their stake in an IPO
when they know that firm performance is about to deteriorate. This increases the
relative attractiveness of the non-pecuniary benefits of control, most of which
remain with the family, over financial wealth, whose future value is expected
to decrease.
KW - corporate governance
KW - family firm
KW - corporate governance
KW - family firm
UR - http://hdl.handle.net/10807/202448
U2 - 10.1111/corg.12446
DO - 10.1111/corg.12446
M3 - Article
SN - 0964-8410
VL - 30
SP - 686
EP - 712
JO - Corporate Governance
JF - Corporate Governance
ER -