Abstract

Medieval Benedictine monasteries followed Benedict’s rule, establishing that the abbot was an elective office. At the same time, monasteries were feudal landlords, alongside secular noblemen, governing over a wide range of holdings. Exploiting the massive land redistribution that followed the Norman conquest of England (1066), we show that holdings governed by Benedictine monasteries were more productive than those controlled by secular landlords. We explore a range of potential channels, ruling out all those that are not related to the different institutional structure. These results help to understand the importance of leadership selection even in case of weak or absent accountability tools.
Lingua originaleEnglish
Numero di pagine53
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2019

Keywords

  • Democracy
  • Growth
  • Institutions
  • Medieval England
  • Monastery
  • Selection

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