Optimal contracting with altruism and reciprocity

Matteo Bassi, Marco Pagnozzi, Salvatore Piccolo

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivista

11 Citazioni (Scopus)


[Ita:]Motivated by the recent experimental evidence on altruistic behavior, we study a simple principal–agent model where each player cares about other players' utility, and may reciprocate their attitude towards him. We show that, relative to the selfish benchmark, efficiency improves when players are altruistic. Nevertheless, in contrast to what may be expected, an increase in the degree of the agent's altruism as well as a more reciprocal behavior by players has ambiguous effects on efficiency. We also consider the effects of the presence of spiteful players and discuss how monetary transfers between players depend on their degrees of altruism and spitefulness.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)27-38
Numero di pagine12
RivistaResearch in Economics
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2014
Pubblicato esternamente


  • Adverse selection
  • Altruism
  • Optimal contracting
  • Reciprocity


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