TY - JOUR
T1 - On the transmission of guilt aversion and the evolution of trust
AU - Lena, Sebastiano Della
AU - Manzoni, Elena
AU - Panebianco, Fabrizio
PY - 2023
Y1 - 2023
N2 - This paper studies the evolution of trust and trustworthiness by modeling the intergenerational transmission of guilt aversion. The results depend both on features of strategic interaction and on parental transmission. We show that if there is complete information of opponents' traits, independent of parenting style, the share of high-guilt agents in society weakly increases over time, and trust and trustworthiness are maximized. Moreover, when traits are not observable, different levels of guilt always coexist, and trust and trustworthiness might also increase when parents have imperfect empathy in the transmission of traits or if there is homophily in society.
AB - This paper studies the evolution of trust and trustworthiness by modeling the intergenerational transmission of guilt aversion. The results depend both on features of strategic interaction and on parental transmission. We show that if there is complete information of opponents' traits, independent of parenting style, the share of high-guilt agents in society weakly increases over time, and trust and trustworthiness are maximized. Moreover, when traits are not observable, different levels of guilt always coexist, and trust and trustworthiness might also increase when parents have imperfect empathy in the transmission of traits or if there is homophily in society.
KW - Trust
KW - cultural evolution
KW - psychological game theory
KW - Trust
KW - cultural evolution
KW - psychological game theory
UR - http://hdl.handle.net/10807/261454
U2 - 10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.012
DO - 10.1016/j.geb.2023.09.012
M3 - Article
SN - 0899-8256
SP - 765
EP - 793
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
ER -