Abstract
We consider a market for vertically differentiated goods where firms enter
over time, after having developed innovations characterised by different
quality levels. We show that patent height and length interact to determine the
ultimate emergence of duopoly. In general, imposing quality improvements on
later entrants entails the persistence of monopoly, while a duopoly equilibrium
emerges when the second innovator is allowed to produce a sufficiently
inferior quality and the patent protection granted to the first innovator is not
too long-lasting.
Lingua originale | English |
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pagine (da-a) | 193-214 |
Numero di pagine | 22 |
Rivista | JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS |
Volume | 90 |
DOI | |
Stato di pubblicazione | Pubblicato - 2007 |
Keywords
- Industrial organization
- differentiation
- innovation