On spatial competition with quadratic transport costs and one online firm

Stefano Colombo, Zemin Hou

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivista

Abstract

Guo and Lai (2014) argue that, under quadratic transport costs, when two offline firms compete with one online firm, the two offline firms locate in such a way that they occupy unconnected regions in the market. However, we offer a counterexample to show that their provided condition is not sufficient to support existence of subgame perfect equilibria, because location deviations to different market structures are not taken into account.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)241-247
Numero di pagine7
RivistaTHE ANNALS OF REGIONAL SCIENCE
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2019

Keywords

  • location-price game

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