On assertion and denial in the logic for pragmatics

Massimiliano Carrara, Ciro De Florio, Daniele Chiffi

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivistapeer review


The aim of this paper is twofold: First, we present and develop a system of logic for pragmatics including the act of denial. Second, we analyse in our framework the so-called paradox of assertability. We show that it is possible to yield sentences that are not assertable. Moreover, under certain conditions, a symmetric result can be obtained: There is a specular paradox of deniability. However, this paradox is based on the problematic principle of classical denial equivalence.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)N/A-N/A
RivistaJournal of Applied Logic
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2017


  • Denial
  • Pragmatic Logic


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