On an Account of Logicality

Linnebo argues that Boolos' interpretation of second order\r\nmonadic logic (MSOL) is not logic. His argument starts by proposing\r\nsome conditions for logicality (ontological innocence, cognitive primacy, and\r\nuniversal applicability) and goes on arguing that Boolos' proposal does not\r\nsatisfy them. The problem is that, in our view, Linnebo's conditions for logicality\r\nmeet some general difficulties on the very same notion. His formulation\r\ncannot be considered a good test for demarcating what is logic at all. Take\r\nfirst order logic (F OL ): either it does not satisfy the conditions proposed or it\r\nsatisfies them trivially. A positive result of our analysis is that an account of\r\nlogicality based on independency is better evaluable in a relational setting.