Moderating Political Extremism: Single Round versus Runoff Elections under Plurality Rule

Massimo Bordignon, Tommaso Nannicini, Guido Tabellini

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivista

20 Citazioni (Scopus)

Abstract

We compare single round versus runoff elections under plurality rule, allowing for partly endogenous party formation. Under runoff elections, the number of political candidates is larger, but the influence of extremist voters on equilibrium policy, and hence policy volatility, is smaller because the bargaining power of the political extremes is reduced compared to single round elections. The predictions on the number of candidates and on policy volatility are confirmed by evidence from a regression discontinuity design in Italy, where cities above 15,000 inhabitants elect the mayor with a runoff system, while those below hold single round elections.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)2349-2370
Numero di pagine22
RivistaTHE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
DOI
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2016

Keywords

  • Bargaining Theory
  • Elections
  • Legislatures
  • Lobbying
  • Matching Theory
  • Political Processes: Rent-Seeking

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