Mixed oligopolies and collusion

Stefano Colombo

doi:10.1007/s00712-015-0467-z

Mixed oligopolies and collusion

Stefano Colombo

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivista › Articolo

21 Citazioni (Scopus)

Abstract

We introduce a firm partially owned by the government in a dynamic model of collusion between a subset of private firms. We show that increasing the public ownership of the non-colluding firm may help collusion between the private firms.

Lingua originale	Inglese
pagine (da-a)	167-184
Numero di pagine	18
Rivista	JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS
DOI	https://doi.org/10.1007/s00712-015-0467-z
Stato di pubblicazione	Pubblicato - 2016

Keywords

oligopoly

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10.1007/s00712-015-0467-z

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abstract = "We introduce a firm partially owned by the government in a dynamic model of collusion between a subset of private firms. We show that increasing the public ownership of the non-colluding firm may help collusion between the private firms.",

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Mixed oligopolies and collusion

Abstract

Keywords

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