Market power, technical progress and financial fragility

Domenico Delli Gatti*, Mauro Gallegati, Antonio Palestrini, Gabriele Tedeschi, David Vidal-Tomás

*Autore corrispondente per questo lavoro

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivista

Abstract

We explore the nexus of market power, innovation and financial fragility by means of a macroeconomic agent based model whose core is the Dixit-Greenwald-Stiglitz (DGS) theory of firm behaviour, which nests the Greenwald-Stiglitz characterization of the firm as a borrower that runs the risk of bankruptcy in the Dixit-Stiglitz monopolistic competition setting. The optimal firm's size is increasing with net worth and productivity. Net worth increases with profits while productivity increases through R&D and innovation. Simulations show that in the presence of market power firms are more innovative and financially robust and less prone to bankruptcy. These features have not surfaced so far in standard characterizations of monopolistic competition.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)435-452
Numero di pagine18
RivistaJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume217
DOI
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2024

Keywords

  • Debt relief
  • Market power
  • Net worth
  • Productivity

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