Macroeconomics and Politics Revisited. Do Central Banks Matter?

Marco Angelo Lossani, Piergiovanna Natale, Patrizio Tirelli

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivistapeer review

4 Citazioni (Scopus)

Abstract

This paper provides a model encompassing both partisan influences on monetary policy and the issue of Central Bank independence. In a regime of partial independence, Central Bank’s policy responses are not immune from partisan influences. Still, the latter fail to affect sistematically the expected output level in election years. The predictions of the model are consistent with the empirical literature on partisan cycles and account for some of its controversial findings.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)53-67
Numero di pagine15
RivistaECONOMICS & POLITICS
Volume2000
DOI
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2000

Keywords

  • Central Bank Independence
  • Monetary policy
  • Partisan Cycles

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