Abstract
This paper takes into account the Etchemendy’s argument which critiques classic tarskian notion of logical truth and it casts light on some doubtful aspect of his approach. The focus is the extensional inadequacy of tarskian logical truth with respect to the relationship between the concept of logical truth and higher order
languages. In the end, it offers a series of philosophical reflections on Etchemendy’s challenge.
Titolo tradotto del contributo | [Autom. eng. transl.] Higher-order logic and truth |
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Lingua originale | Italian |
pagine (da-a) | 79-95 |
Numero di pagine | 17 |
Rivista | Epistemologia |
Volume | 37 |
DOI | |
Stato di pubblicazione | Pubblicato - 2014 |
Keywords
- Conseguenza Logica
- Higher order logic
- Logica di ordine superiore
- Logical Consequence