Location-price equilibria when traditional retailers compete against an online retailer

Stefano Colombo, Zemin Hou

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivista

Abstract

We consider a location-then-price game where two traditional retailers compete with a location-irrelevant online retailer. We characterize the existing equilibria, and we show that in any possible equilibrium there is direct competition between the traditional retailers. Furthermore, the traditional retailers locate at neither a maximal nor minimal distance. In equilibrium, the price of the online retailer might be higher or lower than the price of the traditional retailers, depending on the relative competitiveness of the online retailer and the traditional retailers.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)483-502
Numero di pagine20
RivistaReview of Industrial Organization
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2021

Keywords

  • Hotelling

Fingerprint

Entra nei temi di ricerca di 'Location-price equilibria when traditional retailers compete against an online retailer'. Insieme formano una fingerprint unica.

Cita questo