Local stability of the Cournot solution with increasing heterogeneous competitors

Fabio Tramontana, A. A. Elsadany, Baogui Xin, H. N. Agiza

Risultato della ricerca: Contributo in rivistaArticolo in rivistapeer review

38 Citazioni (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper we try to solve a paradox related to the results of Theocharis (1960). When the number of competitors increases the Cournot–Nash equilibrium loses stability. We relax the assumption about homogeneity in the decision mechanism and show that if we admit heterogeneity than by increasing the number of competitors the stability region on the parameters’ space may enlarge instead of shrinking.
Lingua originaleEnglish
pagine (da-a)150-160
Numero di pagine11
RivistaNonlinear Analysis: Real World Applications
Volume26
DOI
Stato di pubblicazionePubblicato - 2015

Keywords

  • Cournot oligopoly
  • Heterogeneous firms
  • Isoelastic demand function
  • Nash equilibrium

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