Use of analogy within the legal domain was examined, making reference both to normative reasoning and to factual reasoning, that is, reasoning involved in the reconstruction of judicial cases. It was argued that analogy is present not only in common-law systems, but also in civil-law systems, although in a different measure. Both systems seem to be characterized by a mixed reasoning model, in which case-based reasoning intervenes when as rule-based reasoning cannot be used anymore. Results of psychological research on analogical reasoning were taken into account in order to verify the possibility of extending them to the legal domain. Peculiar features of the legal domain were hypothesized to strenghten and partially modify the usual control procedures in analogical reasoning. Specific procedures, like comparison of various possible analogues, or exam of threshold values for a possible analogue to be accepted, may be frequently observed in the legal domain. Role of legal expertise in the use of analogy and relevance of analogy in domain-specific learning were also examined.
|Titolo tradotto del contributo||[Autom. eng. transl.] The analogy in legal reasoning|
|Numero di pagine||20|
|Rivista||Ricerche di Psicologia|
|Stato di pubblicazione||Pubblicato - 1993|
- analogical reasoning
- judicial reasoning