Abstract
The article deals with the European Court of Justice’s decision on October
18th 2011 (C-34/10, Brüstle vs Greepeace e. V.) and it shows importance, limits
and desirable consequences of it. Three explanatory issues regarding the article
no. 6 of the directive on the legal protection of biothecnological inventions
are object of this decision. The most important among them concerns
with the notion of human embryo. The Court states that: “any human ovum after
fertilization, any non-fertilized human ovum into which the cell has been
transplanted and any non-fertilized human ovum whose division and further
development have been stimulated by parthenogenesis, constitute a human embryo”.
Therefore, procedures using human embryos or which implies the destruction
of human embryos are not patentable.
The contest of the decision concerns exactly patent field and the point no.
31 states: “It must be borne in mind, further, that the meaning and scope of
terms for which European Union law provides no definition must be determined
by considering, inter alia, the contest in which they occur and the purposes
of the rules of which they form part”.
Despite of this clear limit, the decision is positive beyond patent matter.
The ethical judgment could not be ignored outside patent field, involving the
European research programs too: economic incentives should not be allocated
for those researches that destroy human embryos. On the other hand, research
on adult human stem cells should be implemented.
Finally, after the Treaty of Lisbon, we should consider the possible influence
on the European Court of Human Rights.
Titolo tradotto del contributo | [Autom. eng. transl.] The judgment of the European Court of Justice of 18 October 2011 and the notion of embryo in the broad sense |
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Lingua originale | Italian |
pagine (da-a) | 777-801 |
Numero di pagine | 25 |
Rivista | MEDICINA E MORALE |
Volume | 61 |
Stato di pubblicazione | Pubblicato - 2011 |
Keywords
- biodiritto
- human embryo