[Ita:]The article shows how in Kierkegaard’s treatment of the concept of possibility (as well as in the treatment of freedom, thus in the not-necessity of the history) both in the "Concept of Anxiety" and in the contemporary "Philosophical Fragments" (1844), for instance, there seems to be possible to make out Schelling’s meontology; I refer to the distinction Schelling regained from Plato’s Sophist [237 a ss., 256 d ss., 258 a ss.] between the Greek “subjective” and “objective” negation, mé on and ouk on, in order to found Good’s freedom in the creation. While the Greek negation ouk totally denies the reality of something both in thought and in actuality, the negation mé just denies the actual being of something, but not its possibility, thus defining something as “not existing”, but still possible.both Schelling and Kierkegaard emphasize the same difficulty for philosophy, that is the difficulty of a scientific discourse which pretends to include reality in a system, that is something constantly “possible” and never completed. To include something in a system means – as we saw – to transform it, through rational comprehension, in something that is necessary, it means to misrepresent it. Nevertheless, Schelling had even been able to include the not-being in its system, taking it as something existing, but in the way of possibility. This is the same problematic point that Kierkegaard emphasizes in the Interlude of the Philosophical Fragments, when he talks about historical comprehension.
|Titolo tradotto del contributo||[Autom. eng. transl.] Kierkegaard's reflection on the first triad of Hegelian logic in the light of Schelling's "meontology".|
|Numero di pagine||15|
|Stato di pubblicazione||Pubblicato - 2014|